Digital Transnational Repression in a Distinct Domain

Foreign Platforms as Arenas of Political Control

Allison Koh

Centre for Artificial Intelligence in Government at

Overview

State of the Research on diaspora dissent and digital transnational repression
Theoretical Contributions: Political control on foreign platforms; implications for state strategy

State of the Research

Diaspora Dissent and Digital Transnational Repression

Liberation technology or digital authoritarianism?

As global migration ⬆️, a new regime threat emerges…

di•as•po•ra

/daɪˈæspərə/ noun

“[A] social collectivity that exists across state borders that has succeeded over time to (1) sustain a collective national, cultural, or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links”

(Adamson and Demetriou 2007)

The mobilizing capacity of diaspora dissent

The pivotal role of diaspora dissidents

At Home

Abroad

“Horizontal” networks at home 🏡
(Brinkerhoff 2009; Alonso and Oiarzabal 2010; Bernal 2020)

“Vertical” networks abroad 🌏
(Keck and Sikkink 1999; Michaelsen 2018; Esberg and Siegel 2020)

So what’s so unique about the role of exile and diaspora communities, compared to many some of the other international actors that also advocate for their countries to engage in these foreign policy interventions?

Exiled dissidents—and to varying extents the diaspora community at large—// have connections to their friends and family as well as the domestic opposition who have first-hand evidence of their home countries’ human rights abuses. // With this information, exiled dissidents can provide this evidence to their host governments, international organizations, and media outlets. And once the information from domestic sources reaches international audiences through these channels, there tends to be more public pressure for international entities to lodge foreign policy interventions against the repressive regime.

The pivotal role of diaspora dissidents in the digital age

At Home

Abroad

“Horizontal” networks at home 🏡
(Brinkerhoff 2009; Alonso and Oiarzabal 2010; Bernal 2020)

“Vertical” networks abroad 🌏
(Keck and Sikkink 1999; Michaelsen 2018; Esberg and Siegel 2020)

What do states do to limit diaspora dissent?

Digital Transnational Repression (DTR)

The use of digital tools to intimidate, threaten, and silence regime critics in diaspora communities

(Schenkkan and Linzer 2021)

So why do states care about their international reputation, and why would they be incentivized to limit diaspora dissent?

There are two broad categories that encompass their many motivations for silencing diaspora dissent.

One of the foremost concerns is regime survival. By specifically targeting the diaspora, states fragment cross-border connections that might increase anti-regime mobilization. States can also benefit from discouraging mobilization of potential challengers at home and abroad if they can take on the challenge of extraterritorially silencing diaspora regime critics.

Beyond regime survival, states are also invested in external image management. As noted in the naming and shaming literature, for instance, states are interested in avoiding negative impacts on their international reputation because evidence of domestic repression or human rights abuses could result in sanctions from other states. They could also leverage a more positive international reputation to promote favorable foreign policy outcomes.

Theoretical Contributions

Political Control on Foreign Platforms

Implications for State Strategy

Varities of political control in DTR

At Home 🏡

Abroad 🌍

Domestic Platforms

Foreign Platforms

Foreign platforms as arenas of political control

The Unique Challenges of Foreign Platforms

Foreign platforms fall outside the bounds of regulatory control for the state.
When targets live abroad, they are also outside the bounds of territorial control.

However…

… foreign platforms are becoming increasingly accommodating to adversarial political actors.

Determinants of state strategy on foreign platforms

Mobilization Capacity of Diaspora Dissent

The extent to which dissidents can challenge political authorities through active participation in political activities (El Kurd 2019)
Many facets, e.g.: working with international media/NGOs (Bob 2005), media freedom in host countries, algorithmic reach on social media

Regulatory Environment for Digital Authoritarianism

The degree to which pro-regime content can spread on foreign platforms
Restrictive: stringent government + platform policies, e.g.: algorithmic demotion of state accounts, managing influence operations, GDPR/DSA
Permissive: minimal intervention from platforms + governments, e.g.: platform compliance with takedown requests, limited data privacy laws

Implications for state strategy

Covert and targeted

Exploiting loopholes in
- community guidelines
- government policy
Surveillance

Overt and targeted

Filing legal requests for censorship via
- host state
- social media companies
Disinformation campaigns

Covert and indiscriminate

Geographic content restrictions
Platform use restrictions
Incentives for self-censorship

Overt and indiscriminate

Preemptive tactics
Positive propaganda

Takeaways

Diaspora dissidents are vital actors in transnational networks, especially in the digital age
Diasporas’ home states will respond accordingly by engaging in DTR
Existing scholarship focuses on domains where the home state maintains some form of control (territorial or platform governance) ➡️ little is known about DTR beyond these bounds
State strategy will vary based on the mobilization capacity of diaspora dissent and the regulatory environment for digital authoritarianism:

	Regulatory Environment for Digital Authoritarianism
Mobilization Capacity	Restrictive	Permissive
High	Covert / Targeted	Overt / Targeted
Low	Covert / Indiscriminate	Overt / Indiscriminate

Thank you!

a.w.koh@bham.ac.uk

https://allisonkoh.github.io/

🦋 @allisonwkoh

Appendix

Why would states want to limit diaspora dissent?

Regime survival¹

Fragment cross-border connections
Discourage mobilization of potential challengers

External image management²

Evade sanctions
Promote favorable foreign policy outcomes

References

Adamson, Fiona B., and Madeleine Demetriou. 2007. “Remapping the Boundaries of ‘State’ and ‘National Identity’: Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing.” European Journal of International Relations 13 (4): 489–526. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107083145.

Alonso, Andoni, and Pedro Oiarzabal. 2010. Diasporas in the New Media Age: Identity, Politics, and Community. University of Nevada Press.

Bernal, Victoria. 2020. “African Digital Diasporas: Technologies, Tactics, and Trends: Introduction.” African Diaspora 12 (1-2): 1–10.

Bob, Clifford. 2005. The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism. Cambridge University Press.

Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. 2009. Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement. Cambridge University Press.

Dukalskis, Alexander. 2021. Making the World Safe for Dictatorship. Oxford University Press.

El Kurd, Dana. 2019. Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine. Oxford University Press.

Esberg, Jane. 2021. “Anticipating Dissent: The Repression of Politicians in Pinochet’s Chile.” The Journal of Politics 83 (2): 689–705. https://doi.org/10.1086/710086.

Esberg, Jane, and Alexandra Siegel. 2020. “How Exile Shapes Online Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela.”

Holbig, Heike. 2011. “International Dimensions of Legitimacy: Reflections on Western Theories and the Chinese Experience.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 16: 161–81.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics.” International Social Science Journal 51 (159): 89–101. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2451.00179.

Krcmaric, Daniel. 2019. “Information, Secrecy, and Civilian Targeting.” International Studies Quarterly 63 (2): 322–33. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz014.

Michaelsen, Marcus. 2018. “Exit and Voice in a Digital Age: Iran’s Exiled Activists and the Authoritarian State.” Globalizations 15 (2): 248–64.

Schenkkan, Nate, and Isabel Linzer. 2021. “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression.” Freedom House (8 February 2021), Available at:{https://Freedomhouse. Org/Report/Transnational-Repression} Accessed 7.

Wright, Thomas C., and Rody Oñate Zúniga. 2007. “Chilean Political Exile.” Latin American Perspectives 34 (4): 31–49.

Digital Transnational Repression in a Distinct Domain

Foreign Platforms as Arenas of Political Control

Overview

State of the Research

Liberation technology or digital authoritarianism?

As global migration ⬆️, a new regime threat emerges…

The mobilizing capacity of diaspora dissent

The pivotal role of diaspora dissidents

At Home Abroad

The pivotal role of diaspora dissidents in the digital age

At Home Abroad

What do states do to limit diaspora dissent?

Theoretical Contributions

Varities of political control in DTR

Foreign platforms as arenas of political control

The Unique Challenges of Foreign Platforms

However…

Determinants of state strategy on foreign platforms

Mobilization Capacity of Diaspora Dissent

Regulatory Environment for Digital Authoritarianism

Implications for state strategy

Takeaways

Thank you!

Appendix

Why would states want to limit diaspora dissent?

Regime survival1

External image management2

References

At Home

Abroad

At Home

Abroad

Regime survival¹

External image management²